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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A long standing feature of U.S. corporate taxation is a group of 
doctrinal devices serving to prevent taxpayer attempts to avoid double 
taxation of corporate earnings.  This Article refers to these devices 
collectively as the constructive dividend doctrine (hereinafter “CDD”) 
and analyzes the extent to which the CDD ought to be set aside as 
counterproductive. 
This analysis is grounded in contrasting views of the normative tax 
treatment of corporate enterprise.  On the one hand is the perspective in 
which the double income taxation of corporate income is normative (the 
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“Double Tax Perspective”).  The Double Tax Perspective calls for 
taxation of corporate income1 a first time as it is received or accrued in 
the corporation’s hands and a second time as those corporate earnings 
are distributed to shareholders.  The normative shareholder treatment 
from the Double Tax Perspective is as full ordinary income in 
shareholders’ hands as corporate earnings are distributed.  It treats the 
reduced rate capital gain taxation for most stock sales2 and deemed stock 
sales3 as a “narrow” exception to this norm. 
A contrasting perspective is one in which all income derived from a 
business enterprise would be taxed exactly once (the “Integrationist 
Norm”).  Under such an idealized Integrationist Norm, all income would 
be imputed to individuals connected with the corporate enterprise—as 
shareholders or otherwise—as earned, and all income would be taxed at 
the individual rate schedules.  In principle, the nearest one might come 
to such a perfect regime is the fiscal transparency of a full pass-through 
regime.  Under such a tax regime, there would be no corporate-level tax.  
Instead, all of the revenue of the corporation would be taxed as income 
of some individual.  The nearest analog is the tax treatment of 
partnerships.4 
This Article is predicated on the wisdom of the Integraionist Norm.  
Elsewhere, in an article entitled Advancing to Corporate Tax 
Integration:  A Laissez-Faire Approach,5 I advanced the proposition 
that, although systematic corporate tax integration is unlikely to be 
enacted in the foreseeable future, integrationism should be regarded as 
normative.  The Laissez-Faire Approach proposes that, to the extent that 
legal mechanisms serve to prevent self-help corporate tax integration, 
 
 1. The term “corporate income” is associated with equity’s residual claim on corporate 
receipts net of the claims of all “expenses,” i.e., the claims of all other participants in the corporate 
enterprise.  See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 
YALE L.J. 1585, 1587 (1974).  Yet it almost goes without saying that a corporation, as such, cannot 
have income in any economically meaningful sense.  If taxation of “corporate income” has any 
justification, it is as a stand-in for the achievement of some implicit policy goal that cannot be 
otherwise addressed directly.  See Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions: Debt and Equity 
Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761, 766-70 (1998). 
 2. I.R.C. § 1221 (2006) (defining capital asset). 
 3. See id. §§ 302, 303, 304, 331, 356. 
 4. See id. §§ 701-777, 6221-6234.  In practice, fiscal transparency cannot be effected in a 
manner that fully eliminates all distinctions between a business conducted directly as an individual’s 
sole proprietorship and an enterprise conducted through a legal structure.  See LAURA E. 
CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K (3d ed. 2006).  
Nevertheless, the partnership paradigm appears to be the nearest alternative possible to the 
integrationist ideal. 
 5. Anthony P. Polito, Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire Approach, 
55 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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they are counterproductive, wasting valuable taxpayer, IRS, and judicial 
resources.  This Article analyzes the CDD in light of the Laissez-Faire 
Approach in order to identify circumstances in which it is best to 
dispense with the CDD as a counterproductive mechanism that wastes 
resources reinforcing the double tax anti-ideal. 
II.  CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS IN A DOUBLE TAX WORLD 
From the Double Tax Perspective, the CDD plays a vital role of 
policing for transactions that seek to evade full double taxation.  In the 
world of the Double Tax Perspective, a corporate distribution to 
shareholders, qua shareholders, out of corporate earnings should be 
taxed at full ordinary tax rates, even to the extent it represents amounts 
of earnings already reduced by a corporate tax.6  In addition, accurate 
measurement of an individual’s income requires that payments and 
property transfers made on behalf of an individual or for the benefit of 
an individual should be treated the same as if they were made directly to 
the individual and further transferred by that person.7  By that logic, 
corporate transfers that benefit shareholders in the same manner as 
dividends need to be classified as such, hence the perceived need for the 
CDD. 
An economic perspective, however, makes this issue somewhat 
more complicated.  Under idealized economic conditions, no dividend 
distribution—actual or constructive—increases the wealth of 
shareholders.  It simply changes the form of wealth holding.  A portion 
of the wealth represented by corporate shares is separated from the 
underlying shares.8  Under the less than idealized conditions of actual 
markets, dividend distributions and dividend policy do have actual 
effects on shareholder value.9  Tax policy, however, has never attempted 
 
 6. See I.R.C. § 301 (2006).  But see I.R.C. §§ 302, 303, 304, 331, 356 (allowing sale 
treatment and capital gain rates in specified circumstances). 
 7. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).   
[W]e think the question presented is whether a taxpayer, having induced a third person to 
pay his income tax or having acquiesced in such payment as made in discharge of an 
obligation to him, may avoid the making of a return thereof and the payment of a 
corresponding tax.  We think he may not do so.  . . .  The discharge by a third person of 
an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed.   
Id. at 729. 
 8. Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of 
Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411, 413-14 (1961).  See also RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & 
FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 397-402 (10th ed. 2011) (hereinafter 
“Brealey, Myers & Allen”). 
 9. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 8, at 402-10.  See also Polito, supra note 5, at 10-
14. 
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to separately measure and tax the increment to shareholder wealth 
generated by dividend payout policy, regardless of whether practicable 
measurement of that increment could ever be possible.  Instead, the tax 
is based on the amount of earnings separated from the corporation as an 
entity.  An actual dividend is treated as a realization event, which, just 
like any other arm’s length realization, does not generate wealth but 
changes its form.10  In the double tax system, the taxation of dividends is 
not a tax on a new accretion of wealth; it is a second tax on an accretion 
previously taxed via the taxation of the corporation. 
At the same time, every corporate transaction that increases the 
value of a solvent corporation benefits shareholders by making their 
shares more valuable.  However, these transactions are not treated as 
constructive dividends because the existing policy is the taxation of the 
separation of earnings from the corporation.11  Because there is no policy 
for the tax on dividends to become a tax on share value appreciation, 
constructive dividends must not include corporate transactions that 
benefit shareholders solely by means of making their shares more 
valuable.12  A constructive dividend is a corporate transaction that has 
the same effect of separating wealth from the corporate entity and 
placing it in the shareholders’ separate ownership and control.13 
This economic perspective explains the existing state of the CDD.  
An illuminating explanation is that a corporate transfer is a constructive 
dividend if:  (1) the primary purpose of the transfer is to benefit 
shareholders rather than for a valid business purpose pertaining to the 
corporation as an entity distinct from its shareholders; and (2) the 
transfer causes property to leave the control of the transferring 
corporation and to be subject to direct or indirect control by 
shareholders.14  This form of the CDD backstops the double taxation of 
corporate earnings but only as those earnings depart corporate solution 
into the hands of shareholders. 
 
 10. See Anthony P. Polito, Borrowing, Return of Capital Conventions, and the Structure of 
the Income Tax: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 17 VA. TAX REV. 467, 492-96 (1998). 
 11. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C:  An Essay in Statutory 
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 100-04 (1977). 
 12. See, e.g., Sammons v. Comm’r, 472 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1973); Citizens Bank & Trust 
Co. v. United States, 580 F.2d 442 (Cl. Ct. 1978); Rapid Elec. Co. v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 232 (1973), 
acq., 1974-2 C.B. 1. 
 13. That a constructive dividend is deemed to be immediately reinvested in the corporation 
does not prevent its taxation as a dividend.  For example, cash dividends reinvested via a dividend 
reinvestment plan are nonetheless fully taxable.  See Rev. Rul. 78-375, 1978-2 C.B. 130; Rev. Rul. 
77-149, 1977-1 C.B. 82; Rev. Rul. 76-53, 1976-1 C.B. 87. 
 14. See, e.g., Sammons, 472 F.2d at 451. 
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III.  AN INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVE 
From the perspective of the Integrationist Norm, however, this 
backstopping of double taxation raises important concerns.  Double 
taxation is problematic because of the distortions to allocative efficiency 
and distributive equity that it generates.15  Integrationism would exactly 
eliminate the excess burden of double taxation and the economic and 
distributive distortions that double taxation entails.  Elsewhere, in an 
article entitled Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration:  A Laissez-
Faire Approach,16 I advanced the proposition that, although systematic 
corporate tax integration is unlikely to be enacted in the foreseeable 
future, integrationism should be regarded as normative.  The Laissez-
Faire Approach proposes that, to the extent that legal mechanisms serve 
to prevent self-help corporate tax integration, they are 
counterproductive, wasting valuable taxpayer, IRS, and judicial 
resources.  Thus, as outlined in this Part III, the Laissez-Faire Approach 
counsels dispensing with those mechanisms to the extent that they serve 
solely to defend the double tax anti-ideal and are not considered 
necessary to ensure that corporate income does not escape the normative 
single level of taxation, and this analysis applies as much to the CDD as 
to any other such mechanism. 
A. Systematic Tax Integration not a Practical Likelihood 
In principle, the nearest one that might come to a perfectly 
integrated regime is the fiscal transparency of a full pass-through 
regime.  Under such a tax regime, there would be no corporate-level tax.  
Instead, all of the revenue of the corporation would be taxed as income 
of some individual.  The nearest analog is the tax treatment of 
partnerships.17 
As a practical matter, the full realization of the Integrationist Norm 
is not practicable because of a number of serious issues related to 
administrability.  Any practical integration initiative would achieve less 
than the full Integrationist Norm, and it would require the layering of 
significant additional legal and administrative complexity on the existing 
 
 15. See Polito, supra note 5, at 6-29. 
 16. See Polito, supra note 5. 
 17. See I.R.C. §§ 701-777, 6221-6234 (2006).  In practice, fiscal transparency cannot be 
effected in a manner that fully eliminates all distinctions between a business conducted directly as 
an individual’s sole proprietorship and an enterprise conducted through a legal structure.  See 
CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4.  Nevertheless, the partnership paradigm appears to be 
the nearest alternative possible to the integrationist ideal. 
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tax regime.18  Moreover, the legislative and interest-group politics of tax 
policy make it unlikely that Congress will enact systematic tax 
integration.   
Legislative action comprehensive enough to effect corporate tax 
integration requires a concentrated and organized constituency that will 
make its passage a priority.  Corporate shareholders have an obvious 
interest in advancing the integrationist agenda, but shareholders of 
publicly-held corporations suffer in this context from the same collective 
action problems that pose the well-known variety of corporate 
governance issues arising in any Berle-Means corporation.19  They 
would need, but for a variety of reasons lack, a well-organized ally to 
lobby for comprehensive corporate tax integration.20 
The George W. Bush Administration assembled legislative 
majorities for two tax cutting acts21 that each reduced revenues by 
hundreds of billions of dollars, but its proposal for nearly comprehensive 
corporate integration22 was eclipsed by other tax cutting priorities.  
Instead, the Bush Administration had to settle for partial relief from 
double taxation in the form of taxing qualified dividends at reduced 
capital-gain rates.  Even that relief is scheduled to expire in 2013.23  
Whether a further extension will be forthcoming is anyone’s guess.  At 
the same time, any comprehensive permanent scheme of corporate tax 
integration is unlikely to survive the politics of the legislative process. 
 
 18. See Polito, supra note 5, at 29-34. 
 19. Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE 
L.J. 325, 363-65 (1995).  Shareholders of closely held enterprises do not face the same collective 
action problems, and the result is clear.  Closely held enterprise investors have received a more 
favorable result than tax integration; they are able, as a class, to elect between functional tax 
integration, see Polito, supra note 5, at 37-39, and inside shelter, see id. at 42-45. 
 20. See, e.g., Arlen & Weiss, supra note 19; Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency 
Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167 (2002); Steven A. Bank, 
Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 
533-37 (2001); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 410, 411 n.8 (2000); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 157, 173-74 (1997). 
 21. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 
Stat. 38; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752. 
 22. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 11-22 (2003). 
 23. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 302-303, 
117 Stat. 752, 760-64 (adopting reduced rate dividend taxation for taxable years beginning through 
2008); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 102, 120 
Stat. 345, 346 (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through taxable years beginning in 2010); 
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-312, §102, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298-99 (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through taxable 
years beginning in 2012). 
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B. Existing System Operates at Cross-Purposes 
Notwithstanding the unlikelihood that Congress will adopt 
comprehensive and permanent corporate tax integration, the excess tax 
burden generated by the classical tax regime is an ample incentive for 
taxpayers to seek alternative means of escaping the excess burden of 
double taxation.  Taxpayers have long had and used multiple important 
self-help tools to mitigate the burden of double taxation.  At the same 
time, the IRS sees itself as obliged to prevent self-help tax integration.  
As in so many areas of the tax law, the double tax regime is actually a 
hybrid system.  In the case of tax integration, the system as a whole 
operates at cross-purposes. 
Double taxation coexists with numerous mechanisms that allow the 
benefits of integration to selected taxpayers or to aggressive taxpayers.  
Some of these are mechanisms that Congress has created deliberately, 
some mechanisms have been created by the Treasury via regulatory fiat, 
and others have been found—perhaps created—by aggressive taxpayer 
exploitation of the interstices of the existing legal regime.24  Regardless 
of their genesis, the coexistence of conflicting paradigms is the source of 
ongoing tension between taxpayer and fisc that engenders much of the 
existing regime’s legal and administrative complexity.  
As long as the double tax system remains in place, taxpayers press 
to escape it to the degree that the rewards are worth their efforts.  The 
IRS, for its part, sees itself as compelled to police for attempts, in whole 
or in part, to bypass the second level of tax and must divine the extent to 
which Congress is willing to allow that escape from double taxation.  
This is no mean feat because Congress has clearly endorsed both thesis 
and antithesis:  double taxation and the escape from double taxation. 
As long as full fiscal transparency is not achievable, some business 
enterprise earnings will always be subject to the excess tax burden of 
double taxation.  At the same time, other business earnings will escape 
double taxation.  It is impossible to realize fully the anti-ideal of double 
taxation, because slippage at the margins is unavoidable.  The boundary 
is and will remain arbitrary because it is defined by the extent to which 
taxpayers are able to take advantage of the escape hatches in the double 
tax anti-ideal.  Yet the IRS bears significant burdens and the legal 
system grows in complexity while attempting to close those escape 
hatches.25 
 
 24. See Polito, supra note 5, at 36-40. 
 25. Id. 
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C. The Laissez-Faire Approach to Constructive Dividends 
The Laissez-Faire Approach proposes an alternative.  Even though 
the Integrationist Norm cannot be fully effectuated26 because the realities 
of the political process, legal complexity, and administrative burden are 
its inescapable enemies, the tax law regime should nevertheless avoid 
operating at cross-purposes.  Complicated and administratively 
burdensome, the legal and enforcement mechanisms that serve to defend 
the double tax anti-ideal should be either marked for elimination or 
simply disregarded, but only to the extent that those regimes reinforce 
the double tax anti-ideal.  At the same time, given that comprehensive 
corporate tax integration is unlikely at best, and that the creation of new 
regimes will not fully achieve the integrationist agenda in any case, the 
Laissez-Faire Approach advances the integrationist agenda without the 
creation of any significant new legal paradigms or regimes.  Instead, it 
pursues opportunities to advance the Integrationist Norm by declining to 
defend the escape hatches in the existing double tax regime. 
The Laissez-Faire Approach seeks to advance the Integrationist 
Norm by taxpayer self-help rather than by assuming the burden of an 
active integration program.  As such, elements in the Laissez-Faire 
Approach are designed to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, the need 
to fashion new legal or enforcement regimes.  Instead, the elements of 
the Laissez-Faire Approach are designed principally to eliminate or 
disregard existing legal and enforcement regimes.  The regimes marked 
for removal or disregard are those that serve to defend the double tax 
anti-ideal. 
The Laissez-Faire Approach, however, is not a program to facilitate 
avoidance of income taxation entirely.  The Integrationist Norm is for all 
income to be taxable at the level of the individual taxpayers, as if they 
conducted the businesses directly without the intervention of juridical 
business organizations.  Accordingly, the Laissez-Faire Approach avoids 
mechanisms that would allow income to escape the full burden of the 
individual income tax.27  In essence, the Laissez-Faire Approach 
facilitates escape from corporate double taxation so long as doing so 
preserves at least one level of taxation. 
Thus, the Laissez-Faire Approach counsels dispensing with the 
CDD to the extent that it serves to defend the double tax anti-ideal.  It 
also counsels retaining the CDD to the extent necessary to ensure that 
 
 26. See id. at 29-36. 
 27. The Laissez-Faire Approach is agnostic as to, and this Article does not address whether, 
the ideal tax base is income or consumption. 
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corporate earnings do not escape the normative single level of taxation.  
Note that the manner in which any such modifications to the CDD 
should be accomplished is an issue that this Article brackets.  It presents 
and assesses the desirability of the proposed modifications purely from 
the perspective of advancing an integrationist agenda.  It intentionally 
sets aside the issue of whether there is authority for effecting its 
proposals without explicit legislation. 
IV.  APPLYING THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH 
The next step in the Laissez-Faire Approach is to examine the 
application of the CDD under various circumstances in light of the 
Integrationist Norm and to determine the extent to which the CDD is 
counter-productive and, therefore, should be set aside.  At the outset it is 
important to note that, because the aim of this analysis is to determine 
the extent to which the CDD is unnecessary, the analysis considers only 
transactions that otherwise would be treated as constructive dividends 
under existing law.  Under the existing CDD, a corporate transfer is a 
constructive dividend if:  (1) the primary purpose of the transfer is to 
benefit shareholders rather than for a valid business purpose pertaining 
to the corporation as an entity distinct from its shareholders; and (2) the 
transfer causes property to leave the control of the transferring 
corporation and to be subject to direct or indirect control by 
shareholders.28  One manner of proving a valid business purpose is to 
prove that the value the corporation receives in the transaction is at least 
as great as the value it transfers.29  Thus, the transactions under 
consideration are those that produce a net positive transfer from a 
corporation to a shareholder or to a third party on behalf of a 
shareholder.  The CDD serves to ensure that those net transfers are 
subject to double taxation. 
While the CDD always serves to reinforce the double tax anti-ideal, 
there are circumstances in which it may incidentally serve other 
purposes as well.  As outlined below, there may be cases in which 
dispensing with the CDD may result in collecting less tax, either 
absolutely or in present value terms, than the single level shareholder tax 
of the Integrationist Norm.  Dispensing with the CDD may introduce its 
own distortions into the system.  Then the question becomes a second-
 
 28. See, e.g., Sammons v. Comm’r, 472 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1973).  
 29. See Palmer v. United States, 302 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1937); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Comm’r, 580 F.2d 442, 446-47 (Cl. Ct. 1978); Rapid Elec. Co. v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 232 (1974). 
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best problem30 of judging which distortions are more problematic; those 
induced by dispensing with the CDD or those induced by expending 
valuable resources on a doctrine that reinforces the double tax anti-ideal. 
A. Constructive Dividends via Cash Payments 
The first inquiry is into the appropriate shareholder treatment, in 
light of the Integrationist Norm, of the relatively straightforward 
scenario of a cash transfer.  This is a transaction in which the corporation 
neither conveys property nor acquires property.  Rather, the corporation 
either transfers cash to shareholders or transfers cash for the benefit of 
shareholders, but it claims no income tax deduction in connection with 
the transaction.  It must be under circumstances that current law would 
treat as a constructive dividend.   
Such a transaction might take the form of a loan from the 
corporation to a shareholder or a party related to the shareholder but for 
which there is no intention for the corporation to be repaid, or it might 
be a genuine loan initially but later be functionally cancelled by the 
corporation.  It might be a payment by a corporation that satisfies an 
obligation of a shareholder.  In many cases, and especially in closely 
held corporations, corporate payments to or for the benefit of 
shareholders can easily have facially ambiguous tax classifications and 
are reclassified as dividend distributions by the IRS.  These cash 
distributions to or for the benefit of shareholders can have three possible 
sources:  (1) shareholders’ invested capital; (2) earnings and profits; or 
(3) elements of corporate value, such as unrecognized appreciation in 
assets and the anticipation of future earnings that have not yet been 
included in earnings and profits.31  
First, the return of shareholders’ capital ought not, in any case, to 
be subject to shareholder-level taxation.  The existing regime for explicit 
 
 30. Briefly stated, the theory of the second-best instructs that, if at least one market is 
prevented from reaching its efficient equilibrium, it is not clear that the welfare maximizing 
program will be to achieve efficient equilibria in the remaining markets.  It is possible that creating 
distortions in some markets will allow a more than offsetting reduction in distortions in other 
markets.  Therefore, if some allocative biases are unavoidable, economic welfare is generally not 
maximized by eliminating all other distortions relative to optimal conditions.  See generally R. G. 
Lipsey & R. Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) 
(explaining the theory of the second-best); see also Edward Foster Hugo Sonnenschein, Price 
Distortion and Economic Welfare, 38 ECONOMETRICA 281 (1970); Kunio Kawamata, Price 
Distortion and Potential Welfare, 42 ECONOMETRICA 435 (1974) (stating elegantly the second best 
proposition).  For a general discussion of the theory of the second best, see P.R.G. LAYARD & A.A. 
WALTERS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 180-88 (1978). 
 31. See I.R.C. § 301(c) (2006). 
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dividends acknowledges this and allows for partial classification as tax 
free return of shareholder capital.32  In that same degree, constructive 
dividends ought not to trigger shareholder-level taxation.  Even under 
the existing CDD, the application of the ordinary stacking rules would 
make constructive distributions partially non-taxable return of capital to 
the extent that the constructive distributions exceed earnings and 
profits.33  Indeed, the Supreme Court has made it clear that, in the 
absence of earnings and profits, the CDD cannot create a taxable 
dividend, even if a shareholder intentionally diverts corporate funds to 
support his personal expenditures.34  The return of shareholders’ 
invested capital is the simple case, but the next two possibilities present 
a somewhat more complicated analysis. 
i. Earnings Distributions 
A constructive dividend, to the extent that it is funded out of 
earnings and profits, represents earnings that have already been subject 
to corporate-level taxation.35  In terms of the Integrationist Norm, 
corporate earnings should be subject to a single level of taxation, not two 
levels of taxation.  If the integrationist ideal is fiscal transparency, it is 
the shareholder-level tax rate schedule that should apply.  
In principle, the preferable solution is to impose the shareholder-
level tax and allow a corresponding corporate deduction or to credit 
shareholders for the tax paid by the corporation.  That resolution would 
require an act of Congress.  If it were feasible to achieve this for 
constructive dividends, it would most likely be possible to directly 
achieve the same treatment for express dividends, and therefore achieve 
some form of systematic tax integration. 
However, the legislation necessary for systematic tax integration is 
not feasible as a practical matter.  It is precisely the unavailability of 
systematic tax integration that leads to this Article’s examination of the 
 
 32. Id. § 301(c)(2). 
 33. Boulware v. United States, 552 U.S. 421, 424-25 (2008); Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. 
Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 392 (1983).  See also FDIC v. First Heights Bank, FSB, 229 F.3d 528, 540 
(6th Cir. 2000); United States v. D’Agostino, 145 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1998); Hagman v. Comm’r, 
958 F.2d 684, 694 (6th Cir. 1992); Estate of DeNiro v. Comm’r, 746 F.2d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Truesdell v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 1280, 1294-95 (1987), acq. 1988-2 C.B. 1, recommended by AOD 
1988-25, 1988 WL 570761; Barnard v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 571, 576-77 (2001). 
 34. Boulware, 552 U.S. 421. 
 35. Some of these amounts are functionally subject to a zero corporate tax rate, e.g. I.R.C. § 
103 (state and local bond interest), but are included in earnings and profits, Treas. Reg. §1.312-6(b).  
See notes 46-49 infra and accompanying text. 
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CDD in light of the Laissez-Faire Approach.36  In that case, in light of 
the Integrationist Norm, the corporate-level tax is best seen as a 
surrogate for shareholder taxation.  That makes the imposition of an 
additional shareholder-level tax an excess tax burden.  As such, to the 
extent that the constructive dividend bails out earnings and profits, there 
is no need to apply the CDD to impose the full shareholder-rate tax. 
There remains, however, a pair of issues that need to be examined.  
The first is any disparity between applicable corporate tax rates and 
shareholder tax rates.  If the Integrationist Norm is fiscal transparency, it 
is the shareholder-level tax rate schedule that should apply.  Surrogate 
corporate-level taxation could result in over taxation or under taxation.  
If the applicable individual tax rate is higher than the corporate tax rate, 
it produces under taxation.  If the applicable individual tax rate is lower 
than the corporate tax rate, it produces over taxation.  
There is good reason to estimate that the under taxation scenario 
would be more common in practice than the over taxation scenario.  
Well-advised taxpayers can easily seek to structure a transaction to be 
deductible by the corporation and taxable at the lower shareholder-level 
tax rate.  For example, a transaction can be structured as a payment for 
services or interest, which are deductible by the corporation and 
included in shareholder income.  If the applicable shareholder tax rate is 
lower than the corporate rate, such a transaction produces a lower total 
tax burden than bailing out previously taxed corporate earnings in a 
manner that produces no corporate deduction and no shareholder 
inclusion.  In practice, therefore, if the corporate tax is accepted as the 
single surrogate tax, setting aside the CDD would result more frequently 
in the under taxation scenario than the over taxation scenario.37 
A simple resolution to the under taxation question would be to 
amend the corporate tax rate schedule to impose the maximum 
individual income tax rate on all taxable corporate income.38  In terms of 
the Laissez-Faire Approach, such an amendment would not be oriented 
towards reinforcing double taxation39 but towards encouraging self-help 
tax integration, with the expectation that the corporate tax would serve 
as a surrogate and substitute for the normative single level shareholder-
 
 36. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
 37. In any case, in terms of the Laissez-Faire Approach, the over taxation scenario cannot 
justify the continued application of the CDD.  That the surrogate corporate-level tax is excessive 
could not justify imposing an even greater excessive tax burden by also imposing a shareholder-
level tax via the CDD. 
 38. See Polito, supra note 5, at 50-51. 
 39. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Repeal of Graduated Corporate Tax Rates, 131 TAX 
NOTES 1395 (2011). 
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level tax.  If the adoption of such legislation is not in the offing, the 
question becomes how one judges the under taxation created by the 
disparity between surrogate taxation at corporate rates versus the 
normative shareholder rates. 
Is preventing this form of under taxation sufficient to insist on a full 
second level of tax at the ordinary income tax rates?40  A few 
observations about the applicable rates shed some light on the subject.  
The lowest two corporate tax rate brackets are relatively narrow, 
applying to only the first $75,000 per year of corporate taxable income.  
Their benefit is fully phased out in any year in which a corporation’s 
taxable income is at least $335,000.41  There is a substantial 34% bracket 
that is lower than the maximum individual tax rate.42  However, under 
the tax rates adopted during the George W. Bush administration, that 
34% corporate income tax rate became only a single percentage point 
below the maximum 35% individual income tax rate,43 which has also 
been the highest corporate tax rate.44  In fact, the maximum corporate tax 
rate has been higher than the maximum individual tax rate in half of the 
years since 1981.  In the remaining years, the excess of the maximum 
 
 40. One might object that, at present, there are technically few such circumstances of under 
taxation because of the application of capital gain tax rates to qualified dividend distributions.  
I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2006).  The maximum shareholder tax rate with respect to qualified dividend 
distributions is 15%, I.R.C. § 1(h), which is also the lowest income tax rate at the surrogate 
corporate level, I.R.C. § 11(b).  However, the reduced tax rates on qualified dividend distributions 
were themselves adopted as a form of partial tax integration.  See H.R. REP. NO. 108-94, at 27-8 
(2003)  See also Rosanne Altshuler, Benjamin H. Harris & Eric Toder, Capital Income Taxation 
and Progressivity in a Global Economy, 30 VA. TAX REV. 355, 357-58 (2010); Steven A. Bank, The 
Rise and Fall of Post-World War II Tax Reform, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 207 (2010); 
Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 525-
26 (2009); Steven A. Bank, Dividends and a Tax Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 
537-40 (2007).  They assume full corporate-level taxation.  As such, the corporate-level tax cannot 
be seen as a surrogate for the reduced tax on qualified dividends, because the latter were not 
adopted as the normative single shareholder level of tax.  Instead, the appropriate baseline for 
judging the adequacy of surrogate corporate-level taxation is the full ordinary income tax rate.  
Moreover, not all distributions deemed to be dividends under the CDD would be qualified dividend 
distributions, and the reduced rates applicable to qualified dividends are not scheduled to apply to 
dividend distributions in tax years beginning in 2013 or later.  See supra note 23. 
 41. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2006). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107- 16, § 101, 
115 Stat. 38, 41-42.  That maximum individual income tax rate is currently scheduled to revert to 
39.6% for taxable years beginning after 2012.  Id. § 901, 115 Stat. at 150; Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 
101, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298. 
 44. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2006). 
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individual tax rate over the maximum corporate tax rate has been quite 
small, and always less than five percentage points.45   
Under those circumstances, the potential amount of under taxation 
by applying the corporate tax rates as a single surrogate tax is relatively 
small in comparison to the large amount of over taxation that applies by 
double taxation.  While this raises an empirical question beyond the 
scope of this Article, it seems reasonable to conclude that the economic 
distortion from relatively small amounts of potential under taxation is 
worth the mitigation of the economic distortions from double taxation.  
In making this comparison, it is important to bear in mind that a contrary 
conclusion also incurs the deadweight loss of IRS administrative and 
judicial resources, and taxpayer planning and compliance costs that 
result from the enforcement of the CDD.  As such, while this is a point 
on which reasonable minds might make a different judgment, so long as 
the corporate tax rates remain in close proximity to individual income 
tax rates, the Integrationist Norm makes the use of the CDD to impose a 
second level of tax on corporate earnings a poor use of resources.  In 
addition, accepting surrogate taxation at the corporate rates provides an 
incentive for Congress to resolve the under taxation issue by imposing 
the maximum individual income tax rate to all taxable corporate income. 
Another potential issue is the treatment of various tax preferences.  
Allowing the distribution of corporate earnings via constructive 
dividends implicitly resolves this issue.  It effectively allows the benefit 
of preferences to be passed on to shareholders because it does not force 
the shareholder-level taxation of the constructive distribution of items 
that were not fully taxable at the corporate level.46 
 
 45. JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, 
PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 7 (3d ed. 2005).  Compare 
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 301, 92 Stat. 2763, 2820 (1978); Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 601, 100 Stat. 2085, 2249 (1986); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13221(a), 107 Stat. 312, 477 (1993) (legislating maximum corporate 
income tax rates), with Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 
172, 176-85 (1981); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096-99 
(1986); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-58, § 11101(a), 104 Stat. 
1388, 1388-403 to 1388-405; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No 103-66, §§ 
13201-13202, 107 Stat. 312, 457-61; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 101, 115 Stat. 38, 41-42; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 105, 117 Stat. 752, 755 (legislating maximum individual income tax 
rates). 
 46. The analysis presumes that the existing concept of earnings and profits applies.  While it 
is possible, in principle, to legislate a modified definition of earnings and profits that would prevent 
the pass-through of tax preferences, the assumption of such legislation is hard to reconcile with the 
premise that comprehensive tax integration is not feasible in practice.  See supra notes 17-23 and 
accompanying text.  The Laissez-Faire approach is premised on working within the existing tax 
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While some integration proposals would require a shareholder-level 
tax on the distribution of these earnings, others would allow for tax-
exempt corporate income to be distributed without triggering a 
shareholder-level tax.47  Pure integrationism treats preferences as a 
distinct question from the integration question.  It does not address the 
wisdom of any particular tax benefit, but it does posit that taxpayers 
ought to be equally eligible for preferences regardless of the legal form 
in which their businesses are conducted.  As such, an idealized pass-
through paradigm of integration would pass the benefit of tax-exemption 
and most other tax preferences on to shareholders.48  The more or less 
automatic pass-through of preferences by not applying the CDD in this 
circumstance accomplishes this end.49 
This analysis allows for a conclusion based on the Integrationist 
Norm.  Admittedly, it is a conclusion with which one could reasonably 
disagree, even within that framework.  That conclusion is that, to the 
extent that a cash transaction is not deducted at the corporate level and 
bails out corporate earnings and profits, it is not necessary to apply the 
CDD to impose a second tax at the shareholder level, so long as there 
remains no more than a small excess of the maximum individual tax rate 
over corporate tax rates.  Under the Integrationist Norm, the use of the 
 
regime, without a program of comprehensive tax integration, to facilitate self-help tax integration.  
It avoids, to the greatest extent possible, the need to fashion new legal or enforcement regimes.  
Instead, the elements of the Laissez-Faire Approach are designed principally to eliminate or 
disregard existing legal and enforcement regimes to the extent that they serve to backstop the double 
tax anti-ideal. 
 47. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND 
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS, TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 15-20 (1992) (recommending against 
the extension of integration benefits to tax preference items), with ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., 
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES; REPORTER’S STUDY OF 
CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION 108-12 (The American Law Institute ed., 1993) (proposing that the 
benefit of specified corporate tax exemptions and tax credits be passed on to shareholders in 
integration).  See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Treatment of Corporate Preference Items Under 
an Integrated Tax System:  A Comparative Analysis, 44 TAX LAW. 195 (1990) (analyzing the 
methods eight industrialized countries use to limit the pass-through of preferences in integration). 
 48. See, e.g., CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE?, 131-
32 (1979) (arguing that investment tax credits should be passed through to shareholders); Harry M. 
Kitchen, Canada, in COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS:  EUROPE, CANADA AND JAPAN 341, 360 (Joseph 
A. Pechman ed., 1987); Anthony P. Polito, A Proposal for an Integrated Income Tax, 12 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1009, 1036-37 (1989) (arguing that tax preferences given to corporations should be 
retained “but only to the extent . . . available to taxpayers who do not avail themselves of the 
corporate form”). 
 49. The application of capital gain tax rates to qualified dividends, I.R.C. § 1(h)(11), does not 
attempt to distinguish corporate earnings subject to full corporate-level taxation from preference 
items.  As such, it allows the partial pass-through of preference items even as it continues to impose 
a reduced second level of tax on corporate earnings already subject to a full corporate surrogate tax.  
See, e.g., Altshuler, Harris & Toder, supra note 40, at 358. 
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CDD to impose a shareholder-level tax on earnings that have already 
been accounted for at the corporate level is largely counterproductive.  It 
expends valuable judicial, IRS administrative, and taxpayer planning and 
compliance resources to undermine the Integrationist Norm.  With that 
conclusion as a predicate, the next step is to consider anticipation 
distributions.50 
ii. Anticipation Distributions 
Cash transactions treated by the CDD as dividend distributions, to 
the extent that they exceed both earnings and profits already taken into 
account by the corporation and also shareholders’ invested capital, 
represent a distribution of corporate value that has not yet been 
recognized and therefore not yet included in earnings and profits.51  That 
value can be the anticipation either of the future recognition of built-in 
gain in corporate assets or of other future corporate income.  The 
monetization of these anticipated earnings, without triggering 
recognition and thereby bringing them within the ambit of earnings and 
profits, could easily occur by means of borrowing.  Those borrowing 
proceeds would represent value that has not been subject to previous 
taxation at either the corporate or the shareholder level, but rather an 
anticipation of future earnings that will be subject, at least in principle, 
to the corporate income tax at a later date.52    
This scenario raises the issue of deferral.53  Shareholders thereby 
access future corporate earnings without triggering a current tax at either 
the shareholder or corporate level.  At some time in the future, the 
 
 50. It is worth noting the possibility of a contrary conclusion that does not reject the 
Integrationist Norm.  Such a conclusion would not imply that imposing double taxation via the 
CDD is beneficial in itself.  It would instead be predicated on a view that the harmful distortions 
generated by continuing to impose double taxation via the CDD are in some sense less significant 
than those that would be generated by the under-taxation of the amount distributed and/or the 
implicit pass-through of preference items.  Such a contrary conclusion would, of course, eliminate 
the need to proceed to the analysis of anticipation distributions because the CDD would continue to 
apply as at present. 
 51. See Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b). 
 52. One wonders how common the use of cash constructively to distribute these untaxed 
anticipated earnings would be in practice.  Such a scenario would apply only to corporations that 
have managed to bail out the full amount of current and accumulated earnings and profits and an 
additional amount equal to shareholders’ stock basis, but that nevertheless continue to transfer value 
out of corporate solution to their shareholders or for their shareholders’ benefit.  Any further 
comment on frequency would be sheer guesswork, but it is a fair guess that the scenario would be 
more likely if the CDD were no longer used to impose a shareholder-level tax on these distributions. 
 53. See Anthony P. Polito, The Role of Prescription in the Interpretive Problem of Basis 
Determination, 53 TAX LAW. 615, 626-27 (2000); Polito, supra note 10, at 505-13. 
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corporation presumably will need to recognize income, which will 
trigger full taxation at the corporate level at that future time.  On the 
other hand, it is not possible to determine ex ante the extent of that 
deferral.  Under those circumstances, is it appropriate for the corporation 
to be able to monetize future taxable earnings to fund constructive 
dividends without any current taxation at the shareholder level?  
This issue arises only if the constructive dividend exceeds both 
current and accumulated earnings and profits and shareholders’ basis in 
their stock, whose treatment under the CDD has already been analyzed.  
This is the appropriate conceptualization because, in the case of an 
admitted dividend, actual distributions are treated as primarily out of 
current and accumulated earnings and profits and secondarily as a return 
of shareholders’ basis.54  Nevertheless, in the case of an admitted 
dividend, distributions in excess of those two amounts are treated as gain 
on sale,55 which generally is subject to a shareholder-level capital gains 
tax.56  Here the question is whether, in light of the Integrationist Norm, a 
constructive dividend in excess of earnings and profits and shareholders’ 
capital ought to be subject to some immediate taxation. 
By way of comparison, if a stock redemption is treated as a sale,57 it 
has the potential to bail out anticipated earnings while generating 
shareholder taxation at capital gain rates.58  Such a bailout also raises the 
issue of deferral, but the shareholder-level capital gains tax “pays” for 
the deferral.  The shareholder-level tax at the time of the distribution at 
least partially offsets the deferral benefit, in time value of money terms, 
of being able to anticipate corporate earnings without immediately 
triggering the corporate-level surrogate tax.  It is not at all inconceivable 
that it might more than fully offset those deferral benefits.59   
In fact, to the extent that stock value reflects an anticipation of 
future earnings,60 any sale of stock at capital gain rates gives access to 
future earnings without triggering full current taxation of those 
earnings.61  Nevertheless, there is a tax charge for accessing future 
earnings without triggering the full surrogate taxation of those earnings.  
In terms of the Integrationist Norm, that tax may well be considered the 
price for the deferral of full taxation of the anticipated earnings. 
 
 54. I.R.C. § 301(c) (2006). 
 55. Id. § 301(c)(3). 
 56. Id. § 1221. 
 57. Id. §§ 302, 303, 304, 356. 
 58. See Clark, supra note 11, at 107-17. 
 59. See Polito, supra note 9, at 66-67. 
 60. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 8, at 78-93. 
 61. See Clark, supra note 11, at 107-17. 
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A different point of comparison is the shareholders’ ability to 
borrow against the value of appreciated shares, or for that matter any 
other appreciated property, without current recognition of income.62  
Doing so is a well-known technique for gaining access to liquidity 
without current taxation.63  The ultimate need to repay out of tax-paid 
income measures the extent of deferral.  To the extent that shareholder 
borrowing against share value is a realistic alternative, allowing the 
corporation to borrow in order to fund constructive dividends without 
triggering any shareholder tax allows no more deferral in principle than 
under existing practice. 
Fiscal transparency that applies only the shareholder level of tax is 
the Integrationist Norm.  Because the partnership paradigm appears to be 
the nearest alternative possible to the integrationist ideal, an examination 
of an analogous transaction in the partnership context may provide 
useful insights.  Because of the priority for already recognized earnings 
under the stacking rules for dividend distributions,64 the analogous 
transaction must be one in which a partnership distributes an amount that 
exceeds income that has already been allocated among partners under 
Subchapter K.65  In at least some circumstances, a partnership can 
engage in anticipation borrowing and distribute those amounts without 
triggering any tax.   
 
 62. See, e.g., Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952) 
(concluding that a nonrecourse secured borrowing transaction is not a realization event and does not 
increase the taxpayer’s basis in the property securing the debt).  Likewise, an early Treasury 
Regulation provides that “[i]f bonds are issued by a corporation at their face value, the corporation 
realizes no gain or loss.”  Treas. Reg. 62, Article 545 (1922).  See Polito, supra note 10, at 481-513 
(setting forth an extensive consideration of the issue of nontaxable borrowing transactions). 
 63. Promotional literature of the Private Client Services Group of Goldman, Sachs & Co. 
indicates that: 
This Group is routinely asked to make presentations for clients who own concentrated 
stock positions on the innovative strategies that are available to monetize, diversify or 
hedge a stock position without selling the stock and incurring a taxable gain . . . . [and 
the] alternatives available to a client with low basis stock, including the following: 
-Borrow against your stock 
-Exchanging the return of your stock for the return of a diversified portfolio 
-Exchanging your stock for shares in a diversified fund 
-Executing a short sale or a synthetic sale and reinvesting the proceeds in a diversified 
portfolio 
-Selling unregistered shares to Goldman Sachs 
-Hedging your risk with over-the-counter options. 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. Promotional Material (June 6, 1994) (on file with the author) (emphasis 
added). 
 64. I.R.C. § 301(c) (2006). 
 65. Id. §§ 702, 705, 731 (2006).  
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When a partnership borrows, no income tax is triggered, just as in 
the case of any other borrowing transaction.  Each partner is treated as 
having made a contribution of money to the partnership equal to that 
partner’s deemed share of the debt incurred,66 even if the debt is 
nonrecourse debt for which the partners bear no individual liability.67  
As such, each partner’s basis in partnership interest is increased by the 
amount of that partner’s share of the debt.68  In general, money 
distributed to a partner is not taxable if it does not exceed the partner’s 
newly increased basis in the partnership interest,69 and then the basis in 
the partnership interest is correspondingly reduced.70 
The partnership debt presumably needs to be paid at some future 
time.  The later income used to pay the debt is to be included in partners’ 
distributive shares, even though they don’t actually receive it because it 
must be used to pay the debt.  That income increases their bases in 
partnership interests,71 but, to the extent that it is used to retire the 
partnership debt, the debt reduction is treated as a distribution72 that 
reduces basis by an offsetting amount.73 
Thus, at this later time, the partners are subject to full taxation on 
the income that was anticipated and distributed via the earlier debt.  As 
such, in a partnership context, it is possible in at least some 
circumstances to make anticipation distributions without any current 
taxation.  The taxation is effectively deferred until the debt is paid out of 
income subject to taxation.74 
What does this suggest about applying the CDD to anticipation 
distributions?  A couple of observations oppose allowing indefinite 
deferral.  First, notwithstanding the necessarily arbitrary nature of what 
 
 66. Id. § 752(a) (2006). 
 67. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3. 
 68. I.R.C. § 722 (2006). 
 69. Id. § 731(a)(1).  In particular circumstances, there may be factors that interfere with the 
non-taxability of this borrow and distribute scenario.  For example, the borrowing and distribution 
may be deemed to be part of a larger disguised sale transaction, I.R.C. § 707(a).  Even to the extent 
that distributing borrowed funds is efficacious in producing non-taxability, some might object to it 
to the extent that it depends upon increasing partners’ basis in partnership interests on account of 
partnership nonrecourse debt.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3.  By way of comparison, in the S 
corporation context, share basis is not increased on account of borrowing at the corporate level.  See 
I.R.C. § 1367 (2006). 
 70. I.R.C. § 705(a)(2) (2006). 
 71. Id. § 705(a)(1). 
 72. Id. § 752(b). 
 73. Id. § 705(a)(2). 
 74. If the debt is never paid, in principle, there should nevertheless be an equal amount of 
cancellation of debt income that should be subject to taxation at some future date, I.R.C. §§ 
61(a)(12), 108 (2006). 
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constitutes a realization event,75 it is not unreasonable to see as a 
realization event a transaction that removes from corporate solution any 
value that has not yet been subject to corporate taxation.  Thus, the 
Integrationist Norm should not necessarily object to a mechanism that 
forces a single level of taxation at the time of a constructive anticipation 
distribution.  
Second, this Article is premised on the Integrationist Norm that 
corporate double taxation is so clearly mistaken that a Laissez-Faire 
Approach to self-help tax integration is amply justified, even in the 
absence of a systematic program to eliminate corporate double taxation.  
The logic of the Integrationist Norm has nothing to say, either positive 
or negative, about the use of a self-help tax integration mechanism to 
create a new opportunity for indefinite tax deferral.  Prudence may well 
counsel against using the Laissez-Faire Approach to reach beyond the 
Integrationist Norm itself to create an additional unlimited deferral 
opportunity.76  Creating such an opportunity would certainly do 
nothing—in a political sense—to advance the cause of the Integrationist 
Norm.  While this is clearly a question upon which reasonable minds can 
differ, these observations present a plausible case for the desirability of 
continuing to apply the CDD to impose current taxation of anticipation 
distributions.   
On the other hand, the truth is that the income tax is shot through 
with opportunities for tax deferral.  Some of these are the result of the 
administrability problems of pure accretionism.  Others are conscious 
policy choices.77  The analysis above illustrates this.  A priori, it is 
difficult to conclude why one additional deferral opportunity is more 
 
 75. See, e.g., WILLIAM WALLACE HEWETT, THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AND ITS 
APPLICATION IN FEDERAL TAXATION 82-83 (1925); Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and 
Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1, 64 (2000); Clarissa Potter, Mark-to-Market Taxation as the 
Way to Save the Income Tax–A Former Administrator’s View, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 879, 882-86 
(1999); Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax:  Some Implications of 
the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. NW. U. 779, 783-84 (1941). 
 76. If one were of the view that the appropriate tax base is consumption rather than income, 
one could conclude that indefinite deferral with respect to an anticipation distribution is not 
problematic so long as the value is not used for consumption expenditures.  In the context of setting 
aside the CDD, however, it would be necessary to create a substitute mechanism to police the 
distinction between constructive anticipation distributions that fund consumption from those that do 
not and also another mechanism to ensure taxation no later than the time that distributed value is 
used to fund personal consumption.  Such a program is possible but hardly in keeping with the spirit 
of the Laissez-Faire Approach.  See Polito, supra note 5, at 40-42.  In any case, the Integrationist 
Norm need not necessarily imply a preference for consumption taxation over income taxation. 
 77. See Polito, supra note 10. 
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problematic than any of the others already available.78  In that sense, 
there is a good argument that concerns about deferral are not sufficient 
to justify reinforcing the double tax anti-ideal by applying the CDD to 
anticipation distributions. 
iii. Implementation Problems of Disentangling Anticipation 
Distributions 
The question of whether to apply the CDD to anticipation 
distributions may be decided by the practicability of implementation.  If 
the conclusion is to allow the deferral created by not applying the CDD 
to anticipation distributions, then implementation is straightforward.  
The CDD would not be applied at all to the kind of cash transactions 
under consideration in this Part IV.A.  The alternative is to ask whether 
it is possible to apply the CDD in a manner that taxes anticipation 
distributions but not distributions out of earnings already taken into 
account at the corporate level.79  There are two possible scenarios; one is 
simple and the other is not. 
The simple scenario is that of a corporation that has neither current 
nor accumulated earnings and profits.  The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that, in the absence of earnings and profits, the CDD cannot create 
a taxable dividend.80  Instead, the entire deemed distribution must be 
either non-taxable return of shareholder capital or gain from the 
disposition of property, i.e., an anticipation distribution that is generally 
taxable at capital gain rates.81   
The more complicated scenario is that of a corporation that does 
have a positive earnings and profits account.  The question is whether 
the CDD can be applied only to the extent that a constructive dividend 
exceeds corporate earnings and shareholder stock basis.82  The 
complication of implementation is keeping track of those thresholds if 
 
 78. An additional issue is the potential for under taxation because of the disparity between the 
corporate tax rate schedule and the normative individual tax rate schedule.  Taken in isolation, the 
issue here is no different than it is in the case of corporate earnings distributions.  See supra notes 
37-45 and accompanying text.  However, the confluence of the two issues is worth noting.  In the 
case of anticipation distributions, if there is no shareholder-level tax, there is both an indefinite 
deferral of the tax and an under tax to the extent that the ultimate corporate tax rate is less than the 
normative individual tax rate. 
 79. If the conclusion of Part 4.1.1. is rejected, the CDD applies as it does today to both 
earnings distributions and anticipation distributions, and therefore the implementation discussion is 
moot because there is no change in the application of the CDD. 
 80. Boulware v. United States, 552 U.S. 421 (2008). 
 81. See supra notes 32-34, 54-56 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text. 
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earnings and profits and shareholder basis are not actually adjusted to 
reflect prior constructive dividend bailout transactions.83  It doesn’t seem 
appropriate to place the burden on the IRS to keep track of each 
corporation’s cumulative constructive dividend transactions, which 
would be necessary in some form to determine whether a transaction 
crosses the threshold into the territory of anticipation distributions.  The 
goal of the Laissez-Faire Approach is to mitigate the administrative 
burden of regimes operating counterproductively to the Integrationist 
Norm.  Its purpose is not well served by creating a new administrative 
burden for the IRS. 
The task could be accomplished informally by taxpayers keeping 
track of total amounts bailed out in relation to (1) earnings and profits 
accounts (accounting for reductions as a result of any amounts 
distributed via explicit dividends) and (2) shareholder basis.  Perhaps 
taxpayers could be induced to perform this task, if it were widely 
understood that the IRS would not seek shareholder income tax 
adjustments under the CDD so long as taxpayers could prove the 
absence of anticipation distributions.  If this were accompanied by an 
understanding that the CDD would be applied to the full amount of any 
constructive dividend in the absence of such proof, taxpayers would 
have an incentive to prove the absence of anticipation distributions and 
also to refrain from engaging in such anticipation distributions at all.   
One is compelled to avoid excessive sanguinity about this 
possibility.  So long as the CDD is being applied to impose shareholder 
tax in some cases, one must wonder how eager taxpayers will be to 
create a document trail proving that particular transactions, which they 
claim are not dividend distributions at all, are actually bailing out only 
prior corporate earnings rather than the anticipation of future earnings.  
Further, one is compelled to wonder how the IRS could effectively 
convey the assurances required.  Even if the burden of proof is placed on 
taxpayers, the IRS would still need to examine that proof via the audit 
process. 
On the other hand, that audit process might be much simplified in a 
case in which the taxpayer can prove that the amounts bailed out do not 
cross the threshold into anticipation distributions.  There may well be 
cases in which an abbreviated audit process proves this to be true.  In 
 
 83. The analysis has to assume that there are no such adjustments.  If Congress could marshal 
the necessary majorities explicitly to authorize the adjustments, it presumably would also be 
practicable to enact explicit dividend relief that would allow earnings and profits to be distributed 
without shareholder taxation of an explicit dividend.  The premise of this Article is that this is not 
possible as a practical matter.  See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
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those cases, the Laissez-Faire Approach counsels that further IRS pursuit 
of the matter under the CDD is a counterproductive waste of resources.  
The question is whether the implementation problem of the limited 
application of the CDD to anticipation distributions can be overcome in 
a manner that yields a net savings in administrative resources. 
If that is not possible, the matter becomes an all-or-nothing 
proposition of whether the CDD should be dispensed with entirely.  
Under the CDD, the shareholder-level charge for the deferral on 
constructive anticipation distributions will also include a full second 
level of tax for corporate earnings that have already been subject to a 
corporate-level tax.  It is not unrealistic to predict that, in terms of the 
Integrationist Norm, this might be a serious overcompensation for the 
deferral benefit.   
If the shareholder-level tax is no more than the preferential capital 
gains rate, as in effect for many dividend distributions through taxable 
years beginning before 2013,84 the potential excess tax burden resulting 
from the application of the CDD is perhaps not that great.  However, if 
the shareholder-level tax is to be imposed at the full ordinary income tax 
rates, then the application of the CDD might seem as a bit like overkill 
for the deferral issue.  It might be dispensed with entirely, and some 
other mechanism might be created for the purpose of addressing the 
deferral issue within the context of the Integrationist Norm.  One 
possibility would be to create a mechanism triggering corporate-level 
recognition on debt incurred to fund explicit or constructive distributions 
to shareholders.  Because the Laissez-Faire Approach targets only 
existing regimes that serve to reinforce the double tax anti-ideal, the full 
fleshing out of such an alternative mechanism to address the deferral 
question is beyond the scope of this Article.  
Regardless of whether an independent resolution of the deferral 
issue for anticipation distributions is feasible, the Laissez-Faire 
Approach makes a strong case for dispensing with the CDD in at least 
some cash transaction scenarios.  If the CDD continues to apply as under 
current law, it is a second-best solution predicated on a judgment that 
deferral, or a difference between corporate and individual tax rates, or of 
 
 84. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 302-303, 
117 Stat. 752, 760-64 (adopting reduced rate dividend taxation for taxable years beginning through 
2008); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 102, 120 
Stat. 345, 346 (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through taxable years beginning in 2010); 
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-312, § 102, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298-99 (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through taxable 
years beginning in 2012).  
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the pass-through of preference items create more serious concerns than 
the distortions of double taxation.  This is an empirical question beyond 
the scope of this Article.  However, in judging which is the more serious 
distortion, it is important to bear in mind the deadweight loss generated 
to the extent that judicial, IRS, and taxpayer resources are wasted via the 
use of the CDD to enforce the double tax anti-ideal. 
B. Overpriced Transfers of Property to Corporations 
The next scenario to consider is the overpriced purchase scenario in 
which a corporation pays more than fair market value for assets it 
acquires from shareholders.85  The application of the CDD makes the 
overpayment a dividend distribution.86  For purposes of this analysis, the 
amount of the overpayment is no different than a cash transaction to or 
on behalf of shareholders.  In that sense, and subject to the same caveats 
as an actual cash transaction, dispensing with the CDD is certainly at 
least as advisable from the perspective of the Integrationist Norm.87  
Further, there are circumstances that can easily overcome the 
concerns raised above88 with regard to deferral when anticipated 
earnings are distributed via a constructive dividend without triggering a 
shareholder-level tax.  If the transferor of the asset is a taxable domestic 
person, the full amount of the overpayment is taxed at that level, in 
many cases at capital gain rates.  Thus, there is a shareholder-level tax of 
the overpayment. 
By way of comparison, if a stock redemption is treated as a sale,89 it 
has the potential to bail out anticipated earnings while generating 
shareholder taxation at capital gain rates.90  Such a bailout also raises the 
issue of deferral, but the shareholder-level capital gains tax “pays” for 
the deferral.  The shareholder-level tax at the time of the distribution at 
least partially offsets the deferral benefit, in time value of money terms, 
of being able to anticipate corporate earnings without immediately 
 
 85. For purposes of this discussion, an overpayment transaction between a corporation and its 
shareholders also includes such an overpayment to a third-party in which the overpayment is made 
to the third party for the benefit of a shareholder.  See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 
716 (1929); Baumer v. United States, 580 F.2d 863, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 86. See BORRIS I. BITTKER, JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶8.05[5] (7th ed. 2006) (hereinafter “Bittker & Eustice”). 
 87. See supra notes 31-84 and accompanying text. 
 88. See supra notes 51-78 and accompanying text. 
 89. I.R.C. §§ 302, 303, 304, 356 (2006). 
 90. See Clark, supra note 11, at 107-17. 
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triggering the corporate-level surrogate tax.  It is not at all inconceivable 
that it might more than fully offset those deferral benefits.91     
In fact, to the extent that stock value reflects an anticipation of 
future earnings,92 any sale of stock at capital gain rates gives access to 
future earnings without triggering a full current tax of those earnings.93  
Nevertheless, there is a tax charge for accessing future earnings without 
triggering the full surrogate taxation of those earnings.  As previously 
observed, in terms of the Integrationist Norm, that tax may well be 
considered the cost for the deferral of full taxation of the anticipated 
earnings.  The counsel of the Laissez-Faire Approach is that so long as 
the transferor of an asset is taxable on the amount of the overpayment, 
even at capital gain rates, it is better not to waste valuable resources on a 
counterproductive application of the CDD.94  In other cases, dispensing 
with the CDD in the overpayment scenario is no more objectionable than 
in the cash distribution scenario. 
C. Bargain Transfers of Property from Corporations to Shareholders 
The obverse of the overpayment scenario is that in which a 
corporation makes a bargain transfer of property to shareholders.95  If a 
corporation conveys property to shareholders at a bargain price, one 
possibility is to ignore the discount and have the shareholder establish 
basis in the property at the discount price.  At least in principle, the 
amount of discount will be subject to shareholder-level taxation upon a 
 
 91. See Polito, supra note 5, at 66-67. 
 92. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 8, at 78-93. 
 93. See Clark, supra note 11, at 107-17. 
 94. The Laissez-Faire Approach does not object to reducing the acquiring corporation’s basis 
in the asset to its fair market value in order to avoid overstatement of depreciation deductions or 
understatement of gain on a subsequent disposition of the asset. 
 95. For purposes of this discussion, a bargain transaction between a corporation and its 
shareholders also includes bargain transactions between a corporation and third-parties in which the 
discount is given to the third party for the benefit of a shareholder.  See Old Colony Trust Co. v. 
Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Baumer v. United States, 580 F.2d 863, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1978).  
Also included is the corporate distribution of options to acquire stock or other property from the 
corporation.  Under present practice, if the option can be valued when issued, the relevant discount 
is that between the value of the option and the price the recipient pays for the option.  If the option 
cannot be valued when issued, the relevant discount is the spread between the option’s exercise 
price and the fair market value of the underlying property when the option is exercised or sold.  See 
Redding v. Comm’r, 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980); Baumer v. Comm’r, 580 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 
1978); Rev. Rul. 70-521, 1970-2 C.B. 72.  For purposes of this Article, the analysis of that discount 
is not materially different from any other discount sale of property to shareholders. 
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later disposition of the property.96  In practice, however, there are a 
number of reasons that might not be considered an adequate resolution. 
• The property might be subject to ordinary tax rates in the 
corporation’s hands but preferential capital gains rates97 in the 
shareholder’s hands. 
• The gain might never be taxed because the property’s basis might 
be stepped up to full value at the death of the shareholder.98 
• If the shareholder is a foreign person, the gain might never be 
taxed because it is foreign source income,99 if the property is not 
a U.S. real property interest.100 
• If the shareholder is a tax exempt entity, the gain might never be 
taxed because it is not included in unrelated business taxable 
income.101 
These seem ample reason to conclude that the discount cannot be 
ignored entirely. 
The next possibility is to continue to apply the CDD as it applies 
currently, but, from the perspective of the Integrationist Norm, that 
would be overkill.  If the discount to the shareholder is a constructive 
dividend,102 then presumably, under existing law, an identical amount 
must be accounted for as additional sales price to the corporation.103  In 
effect, the discounted sale should be treated the same as a cash 
distribution of the amount of the discount to the shareholder and then the 
use of that cash as part of the purchase price of the property.  That 
produces both a corporate tax and a shareholder tax on the amount of the 
discount,104 which is clearly contrary to the Integrationist Norm.  A 
single level of tax is sufficient.105  For this Article, the question becomes 
one of selecting the appropriate party to tax. 
The first option is to collect the tax solely at the shareholder level, 
and not at the corporate level.  In effect, the first option is the same 
 
 96. This possibility clearly raises a deferral issue that is itself deferred until later in the 
analysis.  See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text. 
 97. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006). 
 98. Id. §§ 1014, 1022. 
 99. Id. § 865. 
 100. Id. § 897. 
 101. Id. §§ 511-515. 
 102. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(j). 
 103. I.R.C. § 311(b) (2006). 
 104. Clearly, the double tax scenario applies in the case of a discounted sale of appreciated 
corporate property only.  See I.R.C. § 311(a). 
 105. Equivalent analysis applies to the tax treatment of a discount rental, leasing, or licensing 
of property.  In principle, the CDD currently requires two levels of taxation but a single level of 
taxation should be normative.  See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 86, at ¶8.05[4]. 
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treatment as the reinstatement of the General Utilities doctrine106 via the 
repeal of section 311(b).  At the shareholder level, the ordinary stacking 
rules for dividend distributions will determine how much of the discount 
is a dividend out of earnings and profits, how much is nontaxable return 
of shareholder capital, and how much is gain from the disposition of 
property.107  
The analysis of that possibility begins with the treatment of a 
shareholder that is a fully taxable U.S. person.  If the amount of the 
discount is no more than the corporation’s current and accumulated 
earnings and profits, then, in terms of the Integrationist Norm, the result 
is unproblematic.  The discount is fully taxable as ordinary income.108  
The corporation’s earnings and profits are correspondingly reduced.109 
If the discount exceeds a threshold amount of the corporation’s pre-
distribution earnings and profits, however, then a portion of the 
constructive distribution is treated as either non-taxable return of capital 
or as gain on the disposition of property.110  The deemed distribution will 
not be fully taxable on a current basis at the shareholder level and will 
 
 106. See Gen. Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
 107. I.R.C. § 301(c) (2006). 
 108. Id. § 301(c)(1).  This analysis does not hold under the current circumstances under which 
qualified dividend distributions are subject capital gain tax rates, with a maximum tax rate of 15%.  
Id. §1(h).  The reduced tax rates on these qualified dividend distributions were themselves adopted 
as a form of partial tax integration.  See H.R. REP. NO. 108-94, at 27-8 (2003)  See also Altshuler, 
Harris & Toder, supra note 40, at 357-58; Bank, supra note 40, at 207; Doran, supra note 40, at 
525-26; Bank, supra note 40, at 537-40.  They assume full corporate-level taxation.  As such, they 
are not a sufficient substitute for corporate-level taxation.  However, the reduced rates applicable to 
qualified dividends are not scheduled to apply to dividend distributions in tax years beginning in 
2013 or later.  See supra note 23.  The analysis is predicated on the expiration of reduced tax rates 
on qualified dividend distributions. 
 109. A potential complication for this analysis is that the lack of corporate-level taxation 
implies that the there is no addition to the earnings and profits account as a result of that discount.  
Had the corporation been taxed on the amount of the discount, earnings and profits would have been 
increased by the amount of the tax less the marginal corporate taxes on that gain, hereinafter 
referred to as the “E&P Bump.”  Because the E&P Bump would be less than the corporation’s pre-
distribution earnings and profits, the failure correspondingly to increase earnings and profits is 
unproblematic.  It is true that a portion of a future dividend distribution that would otherwise have 
been subject to tax as dividend would be treated as either non-taxable return of capital or as gain on 
the disposition of property, most likely taxable at capital gain tax rates.  I.R.C. § 301(c).  The 
Integrationist Norm, however, makes this unobjectionable because those amounts, up to the amount 
of the full deemed dividend, would have already been subject to a full shareholder-level tax via the 
taxation of the discount as a dividend.  Any further tax would be an excess tax.  Therefore, the 
shareholder-level tax is more than sufficient under these circumstances. 
 110. I.R.C. §301(c).  If the E&P Bump were included in earnings and profits for purposes of 
determining the shareholder taxability of the deemed distribution from the discount, which is not 
practicable under existing law without triggering a corporate-level taxable gain, then the applicable 
threshold would be the pre-distribution earnings and profits plus the amount of the E&P Bump. 
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not be taxable at all at the corporate level.  If the discount exceeds the 
threshold amount by no more than the shareholders stock basis, that 
excess will not be taxed at the time of the discount transaction.  The 
shareholder’s stock basis will be reduced pro tanto.  Presumably, 
therefore, a greater portion of some later stock disposition realization, or 
a distribution treated as such,111 will be taxed at capital gains rates.  The 
current non-taxability will be offset, but only partially, by a deferred tax 
at a lower rate.   
If the discount exceeds the threshold amount by more than the 
shareholders’ stock basis, a portion of that excess will be taxed 
immediately as gain from the disposition of property.  That excess will 
be taxed at the time of the discount transaction with the corporation.  In 
addition, some increased portion of a later stock disposition realization, 
or a distribution treated as such,112 will be taxable, generally at capital 
gains rates.  Thus, a portion of the deemed distribution will subject to 
immediate partial taxation at less than full ordinary income tax rates, and 
the balance will be subject to deferred taxation at the same rates.   
In terms of the Laissez-Faire Approach, neither of these last two 
possibilities is a fully satisfactory substitute for the ideal single level of 
taxation.  As such, collecting tax solely at the shareholder level is not an 
appropriate resolution for the scenario of a discount in excess of the 
corporation’s pre-distribution earnings and profits, because the scenario 
assumes that the corporate-level tax is eliminated not deferred. 
A potential resolution to this concern would be a minor amendment 
of section 311(b), in place of its outright repeal.  The amendment would 
provide that a corporate distribution or discount sale of appreciated 
property would trigger corporate-level gain only to the extent that the 
amount deemed distributed is not treated as a dividend under section 
301(c).  That is the corporation would continue to recognize gain to the 
extent that the discount exceeds the corporation’s current and 
accumulated earnings and profits.113 
Another potential issue is a concern about discount sales to 
taxpayers that are not fully taxable.  For a domestic non-taxable entity 
the deemed dividend amount may not be taxable at all because it is not 
included in unrelated business taxable income.114  One might regard the 
non-taxability of dividends to non-profit entities as predicated on the full 
 
 111. Id. § 301(c)(3). 
 112. Id. 
 113. As previously noted, the analysis is predicated on the expiration of reduced tax rates on 
qualified dividend distributions.  See supra note 108. 
 114. I.R.C. §§ 511-515 (2006). 
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taxability of corporate earnings.  Likewise, for foreign taxpayers, one 
might take the view that income tax treaty provisions providing tax 
exemptions or rate reductions on dividends are predicated on the full 
taxability of the distributing corporations.115  In either case, the 
application of a tax solely at the shareholder level would, therefore, not 
be considered an adequate solution.116  The obvious resolution would be 
to continue to apply the CDD to impose a tax at the corporate level in 
these limited circumstances.  In terms of addressing this issue by 
amending section 311(b), this would call for the continued application of 
the current rule to the corporation if the shareholder is not fully taxable. 
The alternative option, either for limited circumstances in which the 
single shareholder tax is inadequate or for all of these discount property 
transactions if the shareholder-level tax cannot be made adequate, is to 
collect the tax solely at the corporate level, and not at the shareholder 
level.  This surrogate taxation at the corporate level is an adequate single 
level of tax, subject to the caveats noted above in Part 4.1.1.117  The one 
additional potential problem is that the recognition of the full discount as 
corporate income normally results in an increase in corporate earnings 
and profits.118  That increase would trigger a second tax when those 
earnings are distributed to shareholders.  The simple solution, of course, 
is simply not to make the earnings and profits adjustment.  To the extent 
that it is feasible to set aside the CDD, in whole or in part, it surely must 
be equally feasible to make this adjustment from current practice. 
Neither is a perfect resolution for all situations.  The Laissez-Faire 
Approach can easily find a combination of the two that serves well the 
Integrationist Norm.  In the case of domestic non-profits and foreign 
persons not fully taxable on dividends, the preferred solution appears to 
be to collect the tax at the corporate level as a surrogate for the 
normative individual tax.  In other situations, there is a judgment that 
must be made.  One possibility is to collect the tax at the shareholder 
level, collecting a corporate-level tax only with respect to the portion—if 
any—of the distribution not fully taxable as a dividend.119  If the legal 
 
 115. See, e.g., Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the 
International Tax Base, 47 TAX. L. REV. 565, 565-66, 567-69 (1992). 
 116. On the other hand, if the deemed dividend to a foreign person is subject to full U.S. net 
basis taxation, I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882, or to the full 30% gross basis tax on fixed or determinable 
annual or periodical income, I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881, the shareholder-level tax should be considered 
the normative single level of tax and therefore the fully appropriate single level of tax.  
 117. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text. 
 118. See I.R.C. § 312(b) (2006). 
 119. As previously noted, the analysis is predicated on the expiration of reduced tax rates on 
qualified dividend distributions.  See supra note 108. 
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change necessary to accomplish this is feasible, it will no doubt result in 
over taxation in at least some circumstances.  If this is not feasible, the 
other possibility is to forgo the shareholder-level tax and collect the tax 
solely at the corporate level.  This may result in under taxation in at least 
some circumstances.120  The Laissez-Faire Approach counsels selecting 
one of these alternatives rather than continuing to generate deadweight 
losses by consuming judicial, IRS, and taxpayer resources in an attempt 
to impose two full levels of taxation.121 
D. Transactions Claiming Corporate-Level Deduction 
In terms of the Integrationist Norm, perhaps the most 
straightforward cases are those in which a corporate-level deduction is 
paired with full taxability at the shareholder level.  These transactions 
might take the form of corporate payments to shareholders as interest or 
as compensation for services or the use of property.122  Under existing 
law and practice, the IRS polices these transactions to determine whether 
a recharacterization is required.  The obligation on which interest is paid 
might be recharacterized as equity rather than debt.  The compensation 
for services might be considered unreasonably high.  The result is the 
denial of the corporate deduction and the recharacterization of the 
shareholder income as a dividend. 
Based on an Integrationist Norm, much of this enforcement effort is 
a pure waste of resources.  Corporate earnings should be subject to a 
single level of taxation, not two levels of taxation.  If the Integrationist 
Norm is fiscal transparency, it is the shareholder-level tax rate schedule 
that should apply.  Therefore, so long as the shareholder is fully taxable 
with respect to the same amount as the corporate deduction, allowing the 
deduction at the corporate level is no worse than the treatment of fiscally 
transparency.  A principle of consistency should be sufficient to resolve 
the issue.  So long as the recipient is fully taxable with respect to the 
amount the corporation deducts, the allowance of a deduction to the 
corporation is unproblematic.123  Resources consumed—by the IRS, 
 
 120. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text (outlining the argument that a level of 
under taxation is preferable to full double taxation under these circumstances). 
 121. There may be specific instances in which either the corporation or the shareholder is 
judgment proof with respect to the tax.  In that case, the IRS might be well counseled to attempt to 
collect the single level of tax from the taxpayer from whom it can be collected. 
 122. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 86, at ¶¶8.05[3], [5], [7]. 
 123. If the recipient is not a shareholder, but the amount is paid to the recipient on behalf of the 
shareholder, see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), Baumer v. United States, 
580 F.2d 863, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1978), the Laissez-Faire Approach has no objection to assigning the 
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taxpayers, and the judicial system—in the challenge of the deduction 
serve a counterproductive end, and the challenge should be avoided.124 
V.  CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of the Integrationist Norm, there are clearly 
circumstances in which it is appropriate to dispense with the application 
of the CDD.  In as much as it serves to reinforce the anti-ideal of double 
taxation, it is wasteful and counterproductive.  If there are circumstances 
in which it is to be retained, it must be because of a judgment that the 
CDD serves to prevent other distortions in the tax system that are of 
greater concern than the distortions of double taxation.  There is a need 
for a judgment to resolve this second best problem about which 
reasonable minds can differ.  This Article has presented and analyzed 
critically multiple circumstances in which the CDD is currently applied 
in order to identify circumstances in which it is wise to dispense with its 
application, and it has identified several such circumstances in which the 
Integrationist Norm counsels dispensing with the CDD. 
 
income to the shareholder, see Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).  This may be considered 
important if the pertinent shareholder is in a higher tax bracket than is the actual recipient. 
 124. See Polito, supra note 9, at 51-62 (providing equivalent analysis for corporate deductions 
for services compensation and interest).  A potentially different case is presented if the tax treatment 
of the payee depends on the characterization of what it is for which the payment is made.  See, e.g., 
I.R.C. §§ 861-65 (2006) (providing differing rules for determining whether income is foreign or 
domestic source depending upon the characterization of the transaction).  In these cases it is 
appropriate to continue to police for the correct characterization at the payee level. 
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